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ABSTRACT
Masquerade Detection Based On UNIX Commands
by Amruta Mahajan
In this paper, we consider the problem of masquerade detection based on a
UNIX system. A masquerader is an intruder who tries to remain undetected by
impersonating a legitimate user. Masquerade detection is a special case of the general
intrusion detection problem.
We have collected data from a large number of users. This data includes infor-
mation on user commands and a variety of other aspects of user behavior that can be
used to construct a profile of a given user. Hidden Markov models have been used to
train user profiles, and the various attack strategies have been analyzed. The results
are compared to a standard dataset that offers a more limited view of user behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
A masquerade attack occurs when an attacker gains access to a legitimate user’s
account. Such attacks undermine basic security checks due to the rights given to users
once they have been authenticated successfully. Masquerade detection [18] includes
collecting information about users and creating profiles for them. These profiles can
be based on a variety of information including login time, login location, session
start time, session end time, CPU time, commands issued, etc. If user behavior
does not match the appropriate profile, the session can be classified as a likely attack.
Considerable research has been focused on masquerade detection. However, achieving
high levels of accuracy remains a difficult challenge [7] [4].
To detect masquerade attacks, an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can monitor
each user and look for any malicious or unusual behavior. There are two general
approaches used by IDSs: signature based detection and anomaly based detection.
Signature based detection is useful in detecting the attacks for which signature is
known. In addition to these attacks anomaly-based detection can be used for unknown
attacks. Anomaly based detection models normal behavior for each user depending
on different characteristics and is an inherently challenging task.
The Hidden Markov Model(HMM) [17] is a powerful statistical tool for modeling
generative sequences that can be characterized by an underlying process generating
an observable sequence. In this project we first build a logging tool to collect user-
issued UNIX commands. This data set is then cleaned and preprocessed and then
processed using HMM. With HMM, the profile for each user will be derived from these
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corresponding UNIX command sequences and then would be used for masquerader
detection.
Our goal was to create a dataset which will include only the commands executed
by a UNIX user. Along with the commands, we have also collected timestamp at
which the command was executed, command arguments, CPU time taken for com-
mand execution. Then we ran HMM on this data to make sure it is comparable
with Schonlau et al. dataset. Schonlau dataset [16] only contains UNIX commands.
So, our dataset can be used for analysis based on additional information such as
timestamp, command arguments.
This paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents preliminaries and limita-
tions of previous dataset. Chapter 3 shows basic architecture of masquerade detec-
tion, data collection and its processing. Chapters 4 and 5 give the implementation
details. Chapter 7 explains the results and comparison with previous dataset. Finally,
Chapter 8 presents our conclusions and possible areas for future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
Preliminaries
This chapter discusses the previous work related to masquerade detection.
2.1 Introduction
In modern computer security field, there are many authentication techniques to
restrict invasion of an intruder into a computer system. Computer Systems which
solely rely on authentication based on username and passwords are prone to Mas-
querade attacks where an attacker uses login credentials of a legitimate user to do
some malicious activity.
Masquerader is an attacker who impersonates other user. He makes use of le-
gitimate login credentials of other user to bypass the security check and to do some
malicious activity. Masquerade attacks often take place inside an organization so they
are hard to detect.
One way to detect such an attack is to use IDS (Intrusion Detection System)
based on user profiles. These types of detection systems are called Anomaly based
detection systems. Masquerade detection is a process of collecting information about
all the users and developing profile for each user [7]. This information may include
login time, session start time, session end time, CPU time, UNIX commands and
its arguments. User profiles are specific to individual users and are created using
such user information. This paper focuses on creating user profiles based on UNIX
commands issued by an individual user. Profiles for each user are pre-computed based
on all the UNIX commands fired by the user and are stored somewhere in the system.
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Each time when the user logs into the system, these profiles are created on the fly
and compared with the existing ones stored in system. Any significant diversion
from normal profile (behavior) can trigger the alarm for malicious activity. There are
many intrusion detection techniques present to detect masquerade attacks. However,
these attacks need further attention as the rate of false positives is high during this
process [13].
2.2 Masquerade detection
Some well known intrusion detection systems to detect a masquerade attack are
[18], [9]. These can be grouped into two categories namely Signature-based detection
and Anomaly-based detection [18]. In signature-based detection, user behavior is
matched with some patterns which are known to be attack patterns. If the match
occurs, it can be concluded that an attack has occurred. This type of techniques can
only be used to detect known attacks not the new unseen attacks [18].
In Anomaly-based detection, a normal user behavior is captured and a user profile
is created. Next time when the user logs in, his behavior is analyzed and compared
with the normal one. If there is deviation beyond certain threshold percentage, red
flag can be raised. In this project, we have focused on Anomaly-based detection in
UNIX environment. We can assume that each user will have their own unique style
to issue UNIX commands.
2.3 Machine Learning Techniques
Machine learning algorithms are widely used in the field of computer science,
bio-informatics, mathematics and many more. Machine learning can be used to build
a system that can learn from previous experience and use this experience to give
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some feedback for unknown cases. In addition to simply writing a computer program
to solve a particular problem, we need to have great amount of example data or
experience to learn from.
One example where machine learning could be used is in recognition of characters
of a given language written by humans. Humans seemingly are able to distinguish
between different characters written say in English language but it is difficult for us to
explain how we achieve it. The characters could have been written by many different
people in their own handwriting and style but somehow we are able to recognize
them. Using machine learning, an algorithm can be trained by giving it samples of
written text and it could extract important features from that text. We further talk
about two types of machine learning algorithms, that is, supervised and unsupervised
learning.
2.3.1 Supervised Learning
Suppose we want to classify our input data into two categories viz. good user and
bad user (masquerader) and we have some previously known example data for both
the categories. The supervised learning algorithms can be used to extract important
information from this known example data of both good and bad users. So in this
case, one has sufficient amount of data so as to train the model for each category. Once
we have the model, all the unknown users can be categorized into known categories.
Maximum likelihood is one of the most commonly used classifiers. For each
user, the probability that the user is a member of that class is calculated. Higher
the probability, greater is the chance of a user getting assigned to that particular
category. The advantage of maximum likelihood classifier is that it achieves good
separation of classes. The only disadvantage of this classifier is that it requires strong
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training set to accurately describe structure of classes.
Hidden Markov Model, that is, HMM belongs to this particular learning type
which is described in details in following section. We will be using this technique for
categorizing good users and masqueraders.
2.3.2 Unsupervised Learning
In unsupervised learning we do not define classes beforehand and instead the
data is divided into clusters with the best possible separation. Later, class names are
assigned to those clusters. The advantage of unsupervised learning is that it does
not need any previous example data for all the classes, that is, we do not need a
large training set. The disadvantage is that the clusters formed by an unsupervised
learning algorithm may not match our perception of the important classes. In this
research we are not focussing on any unsupervised learning algorithm and would be
purely focussing on supervised learning technique.
2.4 Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
We will refer to [17] paper in order to explain all the HMM concepts. HMM is
a supervised machine learning technique. It is a probabilistic state machine where
the transitions between states have fixed probabilities and are only dependant on the
current state. The sequential data can be modeled based solely on the current state
[17]. Like any other supervised machine learning algorithms HMM has two phases
namely training and testing. HMM is trained with the known training data [17].
As oppose to a typical Markov chain where the states are completely observed, in
HMM the states are never observed as they are “hidden” [17]. The model will choose
the sequence of states that jointly maximizes the probability of the entire observation
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sequence [17].
Once the model is constructed, we can test its response using the unknown data
[17]. Higher probability represents greater similarity between observation sequence
and training sequence. Lower probability results in a non-match.
2.4.1 Notation
The following information is taken from [17]. Table 1 shows the notations
used to represent the HMM λ. HMM is defined as λ = (A,B, pi) where A is the
transition probability matrix, B is the observation probability matrix which gives
likelihood of observation given the state and pi is the initial state distribution [17].
Table 1: HMM Notations [17]
Symbol Description
T The length of the observation sequence
N The number of states in the model
M The number of distinct observation symbols
O The observation sequence O = (O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1)
Q The set of states of the Markov process
V The set of observation symbols
A The state transition probability matrix
B The observation probability matrix
pi The initial state distribution
λ The hidden Markov model, defined by its parameters A,
B, and pi, is denoted as λ = (A, B, pi)
Figure 1 shows a generic hidden markov model where the Xi represent the hidden
state sequence. The A matrix and the current state determine the Markov process
which is hidden behind the dotted line. The hidden states of the Markov process,
Oi can be observed only via the matrix B [17], which describes the probability of
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observing a particular symbol in a given state. As we do not know what the transitions
should be they are placed above the dotted line [17].
Figure 1: Hidden Markov Model [17]
The three fundamental problems [17] those can be solved by Hidden Markov
Models are briefly described here.
Problem 1. Given the model λ = (A,B, pi) and a sequence of observations O, find
P(O |λ). Here the given sequence is scored to see how well it fits into the given
model λ.
Problem 2. Given the model λ = (A,B, pi) and a sequence of observations O, find
optimal state sequence. Here we uncover the hidden part of the Hidden Markov
Model.
Problem 3. Given observation sequence O and dimensions N & M , find the model
λ = (A,B, pi) that maximizes the probability of O. Here we train the model to best
fit the observed data [17].
The notations used are:
N = number of states in model λ
M = number of observation symbols
A = state transition probabilities
B = observation probability matrix
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pi = initial state distribution
O = (O0,O1, . . . ,OT−1) = observation sequence
The goal of this project is to categorize a user as either a good user or a masquer-
ader. We are assuming that every user has an unique sequence of UNIX commands
which represents that particular user. All other users which do not posses similar
sequence of commands are considered as masqueraders. We propose to use HMM
to differentiate between good users and masqueraders. Here the observation will be
the list of UNIX commands associated with each user. The trained model is then
supposed to assign high probability for commands belonging to good user and low
probability to the ones in masquerade category.
2.4.2 HMM with UNIX Commands
HMM construction requires large training data. There are few publicly available
data sets which provide such training data along with testing data. One such data
set namely Schonlau dataset [16] is discussed in the next section. Using this data
set’s training data HMM can be trained (Problem 3). Then the HMM can be tested
based on provided testing data (Problem 1). A high probability score indicates that
both the training data and testing data have similar characteristics [18]. Whereas,
low probability indicates that there is a significant difference between the two. The
later is useful to recognize intrusion data.
2.5 Schonlau dataset
Schonlau et al. [16] has created a data set for comparing different masquerade
detection techniques. This data set is a collection of UNIX commands captured over
a period of time. It is also called as SEA data set (Schonlau Et Al.) and can be used
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for training and testing purposes. The data set is publicly available for download at
http://www.schonlau.net/intrusion.html [16]. We chose this dataset as it is publicly
available and has good amount of data. There is another publicly available dataset
but it has data for only four users.
Figure 2 below shows the general structure of SEA data set. The data consists of
50 files for 50 different users. Each file contains 15,000 commands. These commands
are collected using acct package [19]. The first 5000 commands from each file are the
commands specific to that particular user and it does not contain any masquerader’s
data. These are used for training purpose. Next 10,000 commands of each user
are divided into 100 blocks of 100 commands. These are seeded with masquerader
commands i.e. the commands other than these 50 users. These 10,000 commands
can be used for testing purpose.
Figure 2: Schonlau data set [18]
2.6 Schonlau Dataset limitations
Of all the available fields of audit data provided by process accounting tool
(acct) only the commands were considered in Schonlau dataset. Due to the way
this audit tool collects audit data from the system, it is impossible to differentiate
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commands executed by users from those run automatically by a shell script or by
the operating system [4]. This may not give an accurate representation of the user
behavior as there will be commands executed by the operating system or other utilities
frequently which might or might not be common for other users depending on the
operating environment.
The data is only good for training purpose. A real time masquerader data is
not available so it needs to be created manually by injecting non-self data. But
this approach may not be accurate and will make the detection harder. Figure 3
explains the difference between two command collection types i.e. shell history and
pacct accounting history. As we can see, there are number of extra commands run
by operating system in addition to commands run by user.
Figure 3: History file and pacct data for same time period
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CHAPTER 3
Architecture of Masquerade Detection
3.1 Basic architecture
Figure 4 shows a basic architecture for a masquerade detection technique. A
good user’s normal behavior is captured in terms of their previous UNIX commands
as shown in Figure 2. We are assuming that each user has specific unique set of
command sequence. We can say each user has his own style of using commands in his
day to day life. A good model should retain all the properties of a good user. Once
the profile is ready, user’s ongoing commands are tested against this historic data
model. If the two profiles are similar, we can conclude that the new set of commands
are from the same user. If the two profiles differ, we raise an alarm saying there is
something wrong and we might have encountered a masquerader.
Figure 4: Architecture of masquerade detection [18]
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3.2 Project road map
As we have mentioned above there are experiments done on masquerade detection
techniques using previously available Schonlau dataset [18]. Though the dataset has
large amount of data collected over a period of fair amount of time, these commands
are collected with the help of UNIX acct auditing mechanism. Due to this the data
set contains commands which are combination of commands executed by the user
itself and the commands executed by the operating system but are not explicitly run
by the user. For example, a shell file is a file that contains multiple commands, and
running a shell file will cause all of its commands to be executed. So all of these
commands would also be recorded by acct.
This project is focussed on collecting just the UNIX commands issued by an user
and not recorded by the acct and to see if we could get better results with this new
dataset. Also in earlier experiments additional information like command timestamp
and command arguments is not considered. We tried to collect all this information
from users. Data collection part is explained in the following sections.
3.3 UNIX Command logging tool
As described in the previous chapter, there are few limitations to SEA dataset
which prevent us from getting accurate results. Our first goal in this project is to
overcome this limitation and develop a logging tool which when installed on user’s
machine will collect the UNIX commands along with its arguments and other infor-
mation. Other information includes session start time, session end time, CPU time,
username. The later goal is to use this dataset for masquerade detection techniques.
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3.3.1 Implementation
For collecting UNIX commands and additional information mentioned in section
3.1, we have used two resources [3]. First one is bash history files which are automat-
ically generated on a Linux based system. Second one is process accounting which
is achieved by using an audit tool called pacct. Both of these tools are discussed in
details in the following sections.
3.3.2 History Files
In order to collect all the UNIX commands issued by a user, we have collected
bash history files [10] which are located on user’s system and are maintained by the
shell. UNIX stores history for each user on the system. For bash shell this file is
called .bash history and is present in user’s home directory. These history files are
collected using a shell script [21]. Few settings are done through the shell script to
set the output of these files in required format.
Settings done:
To store the timestamp along with the commands following setting needs to be done
for bash shell [15]:
export HISTTIMEFORMAT = ‘‘%F %T’’
Default maximum number of commands hold by history file is 500. There are two
parameters namely HISTFILESIZE and HISTSIZE present in file /etc/profile which
determines the maximum number of commands that .bash history file can hold.
User can change this size by modifying the shell /etc/profile. This value is set to
20,000 for our purpose of collecting UNIX commands over a large period of time as
14
follows:
export HISTFILESIZE = 20000
export HISTSIZE = 20000
3.3.3 Process accounting by pacct
In addition to timestamps, UNIX can log all the commands run by the computer.
This special type of logging is referred to as process accounting [8]. Process accounting
is generally used where users are billed for the amount of CPU time that they consume.
This command can also be used by administrators to check if any particular software
is used by any employee that he wishes to remove from all the systems.
For this project the main purpose of using this utility is to collect CPU time and
other additional information as these are not available with the shell history files. The
assumption is that the log file is not deleted. The package is installed via shell script
and the pacct log files are collected on daily basis using a crontab [22]. The log files
are typically stored under /var/log/account. The location may vary depending on
the Operating System.
History files output looks like:
#1336848246
tar cvfz namya-201204081536-history.tgz
#1336848732
lastcomm
#1336852385
ls
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#1336852411
cat home/nm/amruta/cs297/history files/.bash history.3
#1336852549
pwd
#1336852615
echo $HISTTIMEFORMAT
Where, number after # is the execution epoch time for the command following it.
pacct log file output looks like:
acct |v3| 0.00| 0.00| 15.00| 0| 0| 172.00| 0.00| 387 386| T1
find |v3| 0.00| 0.00| 00.00| 0| 0| 168.00| 0.00| 391 390| T2
rm |v3| 0.00| 0.00| 00.00| 0| 0| 132.00| 0.00| 398 397| T3
pwd |v3| 0.00| 0.00| 30.00| 0| 0| 160.00| 0.00| 397 395| T4
Where, Tn represents time as following:
T1 = Tue Apr 3 07:35:01 2012
T2 = Tue Apr 3 07:35:02 2012
T3 = Tue Apr 3 07:35:02 2012
T4 = Tue Apr 3 07:35:02 2012
Fields in above output represents: command name, version, user time, system time,
effective time, uid, gid, memory, io, time. User time, system time and effective times
are ticks per second. The time field shows the start time of the process. We had
requested many users to install this tool on their machines and after few months
send the collected data.
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3.4 Data cleaning
The data shared by the users had to be cleaned as it sometimes had garbage
characters or for some commands the timestamp was missing or there were too many
command line arguments. The user history files were converted to a format which was
compatible with the HMM program. The processing of these history files involved
several steps as below:
• Each of these files was read in line by line to check the validity of each line.
• Blank lines, extra spaces were skipped.
• If a line was solely composed of any symbolic character (meaning that it starts
with a semicolon, dot, hash), it was promptly removed.
• Any line that was thought not to contain a valid command was removed. For
example, sometimes user had typed ‘l’ instead of possibly a ‘ls’ command. Or
there is series of same character typed by mistake as ‘tttttttt’.
• All the commands that started with sudo were converted to sudo . Meaning
‘sudo mkdir’ would be converted to ‘sudo mkdir’.
17
CHAPTER 4
Project Implementation
This section all the implementation details for our project.
4.1 Training HMM
We use UNIX commands collected from different users as DataSet for train-
ing HMM. We have limited amount of data for this research and we want to use
it efficiently. To get meaningful results from this relatively smaller dataset, cross-
validation techniques are usually used. Following section gives a brief overview of
k-fold cross-validation.
4.1.1 K-fold Cross Validation
The basic idea is to efficiently divide the entire dataset into training and testing
datasets such that they do not intersect. Then we run the experiment number of times
on different subsets so as to increase the efficiency of performance evaluation. Usually
greater part of the dataset is used for the training purpose and a small fraction is
kept aside for the testing purpose.
In each round of k fold cross validation, one set will be used as a testing set and
all remaining sets will be treated as a training data. In order to get accurate results,
multiple rounds of cross validation are performed using a different set at each round.
We used five fold cross validation for our project. Each round of this process
is referred to as a “fold”. Here four sets are used as training data and one set
is used for testing. We trained our model using UNIX command sequence for a
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particular good user. We extracted these sequences of UNIX commands from each
user’s history file. We combined all the command sequences into one long observation
sequence [23]. The process was repeated five times. For every iteration we changed
the test data subset and finally got five HMM models per user. We can observe that
the scores for the test data files belonging to a good user for which we trained the
model are higher while those for the other user files are low as all the other users
are considered as masqueraders. We take average of the highest score amongst other
user’s (masquerader’s) scores from test data and highest score from good user’s scores
as a threshold. Figure 5 shows the training and testing phase for User 0.
4.1.2 Evaluation
We use comparison set for testing phase. Comparison set comprises of two parts
as shown in Figure 5. First part is the set of the good user for which we trained the
model and which is not been used in the training phase. This part will be used for
validation purpose, that is to see how good our model performs. Second part includes
all the sets from remaining users which we consider as masqueraders.
In the testing phase, we score the set of good user which we kept aside in the
training phase. In Figure 5 User0Set0 is such a set which was kept aside for validation
purpose during five fold cross validation. If we see the score for this particular set
its -4.457 which is much higher than other test files (which belong to other users
considered as masqueraders). We can say that higher score indicates a match, that
is the set belongs to a good user. Lower scores correspond to masqueraders.
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Figure 5: HMM training
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CHAPTER 5
Experimental Setup
5.1 Data Processing
The data set contains all the files used for training and testing purpose. Original
user history files which we have collected from different users is first processed to have
them in proper format. Then this file is split into five equal parts so that we could
use it for 5-fold cross-validation. We have written a perl script to do this task. Each
file in this folder has name USER[0-N]SET[0-4]. Where N = total number of users.
This folder will have 5 sets for each user. So,
Total number of files in data set = Total number of users * 5
For each data set file a corresponding .in file is created. First line of .in file
represents ‘T’ that is total number of observations for that file. Remaining lines
represent the unique index number given to each command in that file. So at the end
of this process, we will be having a long sequence of indices corresponding to their
respective commands.
There are also .alphabet files. First line of this file represents number of unique
observation symbols in that file which we denote as ‘M’. Remaining lines will have
unique command names on each line.
Once the training phase is over, models are created for all sets of each user. So
we will have 5 models per user. Table 2 explains about file 4 USER0 N2 E0.model.
After testing phase, score files for all sets of each user are generated in Result
folder. The name of file will look like 4 USER0 N2 E0.score where all the symbol
meanings remain same as above. Each score file has scores for two sections: ‘Files of
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Table 2: Model file name meaning
Value Meaning
4 number of sets used in training phase
USER0 user number
N2 number of HMM states = 2
E0 set number which was excluded in training phase
and used for validation = 0
the same user’ and ‘Files of other users’. A typical score file looks like below:
Result/4 USER0 N2 E0.score
Files of the same user:
USER0SET0 -4.457
Files of other users:
USER1SET0 -341.796
USER1SET1 -315.886
USER1SET2 -319.450
USER1SET3 -406.268
USER1SET4 -230.424
USER2SET0 -207.496
USER2SET1 -59.990
USER2SET2 -79.644
USER2SET3 -105.259
USER2SET4 -154.880
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‘Files from same user’ section in this score file has the validation scores. This
is the reason the scores for this section is high as the validation data belongs to a
good user. ‘Files from other users’ section contains scores for all the remaining users
(masqueraders). As we can see there is a particular range of scores for each user, that
is, USER 1 scores range from -230 to -406 whereas USER 2 scores are in different
range.
23
CHAPTER 6
Accuracy Measure
6.1 Possible Outcomes
We have four possible outcomes as true positive (TP), true negative (TN), false
positive (FP) or false negative (FN). Whenever a masquerader is correctly classified
as a masquerader, we say its a true positive. We get a true negative when a good
user is correctly classified as a good user itself. Ideally our masquerade detection
technique should give only TPs and TNs. But in reality we might get a lot of false
positives and false negatives. A false positive occurs when a good user is misclassified
as a masquerader. A false negative occurs when a masquerader is misclassified as a
good user instead of a masquerader and passes the check. Ideally we would like to
keep both of these down to zero but usually only one of them can be kept low. In
masquerade detection though we want to have low false negative rate as we don’t
want any masquerader to get system access as a good user. An ideal masquerade
detection technique should be capable of detecting all the true positives and should
have zero false positives. Figure 6 shows all possible outcomes as discussed.
6.2 Receiver Operating Characteristic
Originally, the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) was developed for signal
detection applications [6]. ROC is widely used for evaluating the performance of vari-
ous machine learning algorithms [5], [2]. On X-axis, we have false positive rate(FPR)
i.e. when a good user is identified as a masquerader and Y-axis has true positive
rate (TPR) i.e. when a masquerader is correctly identified [20]. TPR and FPR are
calculated as below:
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Figure 6: Possible Outcomes [11]
TPR = TP
TP+FN
FPR = FP
FP+TN
Figure 7 shows example of a ROC curve.
The top left portion of a ROC curve represents higher true positive rate. So if
the curve lies in that part, we get the better classification. Diagonal is our reference
line. An algorithm with 50% accuracy will have its ROC curve along the diagonal line
[20]. An ideal case is shown by the brown line with the diamonds from Figure 7. It
has 100% true positive rate and 0% false positive rate. The blue line having squares
on it represents an algorithm with approximately 78% true positive rate and 10%
false positive rate [20]. The line with triangles on it shows that this algorithm is not
performing that well. The area under the curve (AUC) shows how well a technique
can distinguish between two groups, in our case a masquerader versus a good user.
In ROC analysis, if the area is closer to 1.0 then the result of the test is considered to
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be better compared to when the area is closer to 0.5. We will be using ROC curves
for our HMM detector.
Figure 7: ROC Example [20]
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CHAPTER 7
Experimental Results
We have considered different number of states for the Hidden Markov Model i.e.
N = 2to6. We ran our experiments on all these states. As we have used five fold cross
validation, after testing phase we got five models for each user. We plotted graphs for
all the users. For subsequent amount (half) of users, there was a complete separation
between good users’ scores and all the masqueraders’ scores. This means that log
likelihood per command (LLPC) for all the good users were higher than those of all
the masqueraders. For the remaining models, we observed some overlapping between
the two scores. This happened because some masqueraders had higher scores than a
good user’s score.
Let’s look at the result of running HMM for one of the good users i.e. ‘User 10’.
Figure 8 shows the result for this particular user. We used N = 2 i.e. the HMM with
two number of states. It can be observed from the graph that all the masqueraders
have lower scores than that of the good user (User 10 in this case). The result is not
perfect though as two masqueraders have been misclassified as good users. Also one
good user’s set is been misclassified as a masquerader.
For each model, we found a number of false positives as well as false negatives.
When a good user is misclassified as a masquerader a false positive occurs . So for
this particular model, we have two false negatives and one false positive.
Hidden Markov Model classifies a user into either category by comparing its score
with the threshold value. Therefore setting our threshold value to some higher number
or a lower number affects our results. Depending on the threshold value, number of
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Figure 8: Log likelihood per command of User 10 Vs masqueraders for N = 2
false positives and false negatives may vary. Higher the threshold, fewer the false
positives. However setting the threshold higher usually results in more number of
false negatives as more users may have scores lower than the threshold.
We have plotted a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve for the above
model considering different threshold values. Figure 9 shows the ROC curve for above
case. Area under the curve for this ROC is 0.963 which is much higher than 0.5 but
this case is not as good as other cases.
Next, we see some of the typical cases where there is a good separation between
a good user and all the masqueraders. Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 shows such
users.
As we can see for all the above users there is a complete separation of two
categories. The ROC plots for these users are shown in Figure 13, Figure 14 and
Figure 15 respectively. AUC for User 2 and 4 are 1.0 which are ideal cases as there
are no false positive or false negatives. But for User 0, AUC is 0.958 as 1 of the
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Figure 9: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, User 10, N = 2
Figure 10: Log likelihood per command (LLPC) of good user 2, masqueraders for
N = 2
masquerader is very close to a good user range.
29
Figure 11: Log likelihood per command (LLPC) of good user 4, masqueraders for
N = 2
Figure 12: Log likelihood per command (LLPC) of good user 0, masqueraders for
N = 2
7.1 Multiple HMM states
We also ran all the test cases for N = 3, 4, 5, 6 but there is not much significant
change in results for all these states. So we can say that HMM states does not affect
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Figure 13: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, User 2, N = 2
Figure 14: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, User 4, N = 2
our results much.
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Figure 15: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve, User 0, N = 2
7.2 Using more data for testing
We experimented with the proportion of data used for training and testing. As
we have discussed in earlier chapters, five fold validation uses four sets for training
and just one set for testing. We thought of using more data for validation purpose
and see if the results vary because of this change. We have used three fold cross
validation for this, that is, we kept two sets aside for validation and we performed
three fold validation on remaining three sets. So in total we had three sets for testing.
We observed that for most of the users, the graphs for five fold validation (with
less testing data) and three fold validation (with more testing data) are almost iden-
tical. For some users, there is slight change in the result when more data is used for
validation.
For some of the users five fold cross validation shows better results. Figure 12
shows five fold cross validation results for User 0 where we can see separation whereas,
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Figure 16 shows results for three fold cross validation for same user where one point
had been misclassified as a masquerader.
Figure 16: User 0, 3 fold cross validation (more validation data)
Let us look at some cases where three fold cross validation gives better results
over five fold cross validation. Lets consider User 5 first. Figure 17 shows graph for
five fold cross validation (with less validation data). As we can see due to the point
which is closer to -100, we can not draw a line which separates User 5 (good user)
and all other masqueraders.
Figure 18 shows the graph for same user, that is, User 5 but with more validation
data (three fold cross validation). Here we can see that now there is a complete
separation between the two classes, which is a good thing. This seems somewhat
counterintuitive but we think that this could be because of changing user command
history over time and since in three fold cross validation we used lesser history for
training, the model better captured the user profile.
Similarly, Figure 19 and Figure 20 shows differences for User 9. Here for less data
there is no complete separation whereas with more validation data, we are getting
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Figure 17: User 5, 5 fold cross validation (less validation data)
Figure 18: User 5, 3 fold cross validation (more validation data)
better results over the earlier case.
7.3 Effect of varying testing data sequence size
This section discusses the correlation between length of test sequence and its
effectiveness. We have generated five different cases for variable length testing data
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Figure 19: User 9, 5 fold cross validation (less validation data)
Figure 20: User 9, 3 fold cross validation (more validation data)
sequences. Table 3 refers to these five cases. In case 1, the testing data set is divided
in two parts so third column is 50% .
Keeping the training data constant in size, we are reducing length of the scoring
dataset to see if this changes our earlier results. Figure 21 shows the experimental
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Table 3: Experiment Cases For Generating Multiple Test Sequences
Case Number Number of Sequences % Test Data per sequence
1 2 50 %
2 4 25 %
3 10 10 %
4 15 6.6 %
5 20 5 %
results for User 3. We reduced testing data length for User 3 from 1864 to 93 i.e.
Case 5. As we can see here, more the testing data better the results given by HMM.
Similarly, for less amount of testing data, the results are not that great.
Figure 21: Comparison of different test length sequences, User 3
Figure 22 shows similar results for User 11.
We observed that, for 40% of users out of total, there is no significant effect of
varying the testing data sequence. Figure 23 shows such an example. For User 13,
there is no significant change in results when the testing sequence size is varied. This
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Figure 22: Comparison of different test length sequences, User 11
might be because this user has large number of commands as compared to other users.
We were not able to include more cases for this experiment because of the limited
number of UNIX commands for some users.
7.4 Comparison with Schonlau Dataset
We ran our experiments on Schonlau dataset to see if the results vary from the
ones we got with our dataset. Figure 24 and Figure 25 shows the experimental results
for Schonlau dataset’s User 1 and User 7.
The results using Schonlau’s dataset and using our new dataset are similar.
For Schonlau dataset we observed good separation for fewer users but in our case,
results for 50% of users have complete or good separation between good users and
masqueraders. One of the reasons for lesser number of users getting good separation
in case of Schonlau dataset could be that the dataset has more number of users along
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Figure 23: Comparison of different test lengths sequences, User 13
Figure 24: Experimental Results for Schonlau Dataset, User 1
with large number of commands per user. So there is higher probability of users using
similar commands and thus having higher scores.
We also plotted ROC for one of the users’ in Schonlau dataset. Figure 26 shows
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Figure 25: Experimental Results for Schonlau Dataset, User 7
the ROC. AUC for this particular user is 0.89.
Figure 26: ROC for Schonlau Dataset, User 7
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusion
In this project, we have created a new UNIX commands dataset which will only
include UNIX commands issued by a user and not the commands executed by the
system. This new dataset also has command execution timestamp and arguments in
addition to the commands themselves. We used HMM for masquerader detection on
this data and ran a number of tests on this new dataset to see if it is comparable to
Schonlau dataset. We have analyzed the results and concluded that the results with
this dataset are good and similar to that of the Schonlau dataset. For few users, the
results are not that good. We think the reason for this might be lesser number of
commands for those users. Another reason might be, these users executed commands
that are similar to some other users. Due to which a conservative threshold calculation
results in more false negatives.
We also ran experiments for different number of states of HMM and found that
number of states does not have significant impact on the results. The HMM with two
hidden states performs slightly better than other states for some users.
We experimented with size of both training and testing data set sequences. We
conjectured that the results are better when more training data is used for most
cases. Similarly, we observed that the results are better when longer test command
sequences are used over shorter ones.
Initially we were thinking to use a dataset that had a similar structure to the
Schonlau dataset. This would imply that, the testing data is mixed with other users
(not in training dataset). When we analyzed our dataset we found that lot of users
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have similar commands, so as a start we decided to consider other user’s data as mas-
querader data instead of creating intrusion data by inserting other users commands
with good users commands. One future is to use the timestamp and arguments in
conjunction with the commands issued by users and test if the results improve. Sec-
ondly, create masquerader dataset by mixing good and other user’s data and use that
for testing purpose.
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APPENDIX A
Scripts Used To Collect Data
A.1 Setup
The following script will install pacct package on user’s machine and will also
do necessary settings for .bash history file.
numbersep
1 #!/ bin /bash
#part1 − pacct package setup
3 USERHOME=$ ( eva l echo ˜${SUDO USER})
BASHRC LOCATION=$USER HOME/ . bashrc
5 DEFAULT ACCT FILE=/etc / d e f au l t / acct
BASEDIR=$USER HOME/ amruta masquerade detec t i on pro j ec t
7
i f [ −f / e t c / deb i an ve r s i on ] ;
9 then
DISTRO=Debian
11 echo ‘ ‘ I n s t a l l i n g acct f o r $DISTRO’ ’
sudo apt−get i n s t a l l acc t
13 e l s e
echo ‘ ‘ This opera t ing system i s not supported ’ ’
15 e x i t −1
f i
17
#change ACCT LOGGING= ‘ ‘30 ’ ’ to 60
19 sudo sed − i ‘ s /ACCT LOGGING=\ ‘ ‘ .∗\ ’ ’ /ACCT LOGGING=\ ‘ ‘60\ ’ ’/ ’
44
$DEFAULT ACCT FILE
21 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
#CHANGE THE BASH HISTORY SO THAT IT DISPLAYS TIMESTAMP
23 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
echo ‘ ‘ export HISTTIMEFORMAT = ‘ %F %T ’ ’ ’ >>$BASHRC LOCATION
25 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
#CHANGE THE BASH HISTORY SO THAT BASH HISTORY FILE SIZE IS
SUFFICIENTLY LARGE
27 #∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗
echo ‘ ‘ export HISTFILESIZE=20000 ’ ’ >>$BASHRC LOCATION
29 echo ‘ ‘ export HISTSIZE=20000 ’ ’ >>$BASHRC LOCATION
#part2 − cronjob setup ( execute cronjob −e on user ’ s machine )
31 ( crontab − l ; echo ‘ ‘00 12 ∗ ∗ ∗ $BASEDIR/ s c r i p t s /
c o p y h i s t o r y f i l e s . sh >> $BASEDIR/ s c r i p t s / c o p y h i s t o r y f i l e s .
l og 2>&1’ ’) | crontab −
setup.sh
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A.2 Copy History Files
The following script will collect .bash history.
numbersep
#!/ bin /bash
2 #Copy /home/$USER/ . ba sh h i s t o ry to de s i r ed l o c a t i o n
#Auto Archive countdown move loop
4 #This s c r i p t w i l l c r e a t e $count number o f backups o f a g iven f i l e
count=120
6 move=$ [ $count − 1 ]
USERHOME=$ ( eva l echo ˜${SUDO USER})
8 BASEDIR=$USER HOME/ amruta masquerade detec t i on pro j ec t
s f o l d e r = ‘ ‘$USER HOME’ ’
10 d f o l d e r = ‘ ‘$BASEDIR/ h i s t o r y f i l e s ’ ’
f i l e = ‘ ‘ . bash h i s to ry ’ ’
12 date
14 #check i f the backup f o l d e r i s pre sent
i f [ ! −d $d f o l d e r ]
16 then
mkdir $d f o l d e r
18 f i
20 # Automate un t i l $count = 0
whi le [ $count −gt 0 ]
22 do
i f [ −e $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . $move ]
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24 then
echo ‘ ‘Moving $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . $move to $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . $count ’ ’
26 mv $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . $move $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . $count
f i
28 count=$ [ $count − 1 ]
move=$ [ $move − 1 ]
30 done
echo ‘ ‘ Copying $ s f o l d e r / $ f i l e to $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . 0 ’ ’
32 cp $ s f o l d e r / $ f i l e $d f o l d e r / $ f i l e . 0
#EOF
copy history files.sh
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